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New Deal Labor Policy and the 
Containment of Radical Union Activity 
 
By: Rick Hurd 
Abstract  
New Deal labor policies were designed with the stability of the capitalist economy in mind. Their 
pro-union provisions responded to labor militance and served to head off the formation of a radical 
working-class movement. The National Labor Relations Act established procedures which encouraged 
unions to pursue peaceful collective bargaining rather than a more activist course. Although the 
enforcement of pro-union policies was weak, the fact that they were adopted gave the impression that 
the state was sensitive to worker interests. When the crisis ended with the onset of World War II, the 
state reverted to an approach which more directly restricted worker militance. 
  
 
There is widespread agreement among radicals that the state serves the needs of capital. If this 
position is to be defended, reforms adopted by the state which seems to be pro-working class must be 
explained. Of particular interest in this regard is the federal labor policy of the New Deal which, at least 
on the surface, offered no advantage to capital. By most traditional accounts, the 1935 National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) placed the state on the side of labor and laid the foundation for an unprecedented 
growth in union membership which continued for more than ten years 
If the NLRA and other labor policies of the 1930s were as favorable to the working class in 
impact as in appearance, then the radical analysis of the role of the state should be reevaluated. This 
would lend credence to the social democratic position that progressive reforms are possible within 
capitalism. 
It is argued below that the labor policies adopted during the Great Depression were necessary 
responses to the crisis in capitalism. If the working class was to be persuaded that the capitalist system 
was worth preserving, it was necessary to demonstrate that the state was willing to be responsive to 
worker concerns. In actuality, the policies were more progressive in appearance than in effect. Not only 
was the NLRA poorly enforced, but also the availability of legal remedies to working class problems 
tended to sap worker militance and reduce the intensity of the class struggle. Furthermore, as soon as 
the crisis was over and the pressure was off, state labor policy was revised and overt repression of 
working class militance was reinstituted. 
The essential flaw in the traditional analysis is its focus on the political-legal process leading to 
the passage of particular acts by the Congress and on the judicial interpretation of these acts.** Some 
liberal historians have noted that the legislation was intended to preserve capitalism, but because they 
accept this as a legitimate goal their analysis stops there.1 
This article is one step towards a radical reevaluation of the historical development of federal 
labor legislation. It points to an alternative explanation of the evolution of labor law. This explanation 
starts from the view which identifies Congressional action as a formal expression of the needs of the 
economic system. It is the capitalist economy that is the driving force behind the regulation of labor. 
Analytical Framework 
This paper accepts the thesis that the state serves the interests of capital. This is not to say that 
capitalists control the state apparatus, but rather that the state is committed to the preservation of the 
capitalist system, making such direct control unnecessary. 
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In fulfilling its system preserving duties, the state performs two (sometimes conflicting) 
functions. First, the state directly aids capital in its drive for profits, for instance by repressing working 
class movements. Second, the state attempts to maintain an atmosphere of social harmony in order to 
assure that capital operates in a non-hostile environment. Thus the state will sometimes adopt policies 
which respond to working class needs and demands. However, such policies are reformist, projecting 
the appearance of change without actually re-ordering society.2 
The following evaluation of federal law can be briefly summarized in terms of the functions of 
the state. Prior to the 1930’s the repressive labor policy of the state overtly supported capital. During 
the 1930’s potential and actual working class militance necessitated a shift in policy and the state 
adopted reforms which appeared to be pro-worker. However, these policies allowed working class 
activity which conflicted with the profit needs of capital, and the developments of the 1940’s and 1950’s 
reflect an attempt by the state to balance its two functions.  
Labor Policy Before the Great Depression* 
The Sherman Act of 1890 was antitrust legislation ostensibly aimed at curbing the economic 
power of capital. However, the "restraint of trade" provisions were interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
applicable to various forms of economic pressure employed by unions. It became standard practice for 
federal courts to issue injunctions against strikes, boycotts, and picketing.3 
Federal court injunctions also restricted union organizing activity. Prior to the 1930’s it was 
common for capital to require that before being hired workers sign contracts agreeing not to join a 
union. Organizing drives among workers who had signed these "yellow dog contracts" were considered 
to be attempts to induce breach of contract and were enjoined by federal courts.4  
The labor injunction placed the state clearly on the side of capital. This overt assistance was 
possible because of the nature of the labor movement in the United States.  
The conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL) gained control of the labor movement in 
the late nineteenth century by practicing "pure-and-simple" business unionism. It restricted its 
organizing activities almost exclusively to craft workers and concentrated on raising their wages, 
ignoring most production workers and eschewing political activity. Because the AFL was not interested 
in building a class conscious union movement, its leaders were eventually granted a certain amount of 
status and access to business and government officials. AFL leaders, then, were recognized as 
spokespersons for the working class in return for their continued support of capitalism.  
Although the general tendency was for state labor policy to be overtly pro-capital, three 
exceptions warrent brief mention. First, in response to the AFL’s lobbying efforts, the Clayton Act of 
1914 included clauses which appeared to limit the application of antitrust legislation against unions. This 
gesture by the state was effective, prompting Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, to proclaim that 
the act was "Labor’s Magna Carta “.5 It was, as it turned out, far from a Magna Carta because its loose 
wording enabled the courts to interpret the act to the benefit of capital. A supreme court ruling allowed 
the continued use of injunctions in most labor conflicts.6 This turn of events did not politicize labor, 
however, as the AFL blamed the judiciary rather than capitalism.  
Second, during World War I the War Labor Board secured the AFL’s cooperation in the war 
effort by protecting labor’s right to organize and by promoting collective bargaining. But as soon as the 
war was over, War Labor Board protections were withdrawn.7 Capital weathered a big strike year in 
1919 with the help of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice. Crucial here was a red 
scare waged by capital and the state with the cooperation of AFL leaders, which decimated the 
progressive ranks of labor.8 The 1920’s witnessed a substantial increase in the use of labor injunctions. 
                                                          
** Definitions are included in Appendix B. 
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Third, the Railway Labor Act of 1926 protected labor’s right to organize in that industry in return 
for limitation of the right to strike.9 In this act, supported by both unions and capital, the state 
foreshadowed by twenty years its current policy of balancing its functions of aiding profits and 
preserving social harmony. 
The Norris La Guardia Act 
During the 1930’s the state altered its labor policy. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 made 
yellow dog contracts unenforceable and strictly limited the power of federal courts to issue injunctions 
in labor disputes.10 
The AFL had been lobbying for anti-injunction legislation since the early 1900’s with a consistent 
record of failure. In 1908 the AFL-supported Peare Bill got nowhere. The Clayton Act anti-injunction 
language was ineffective. In 1927 the Shipstead Act died. The Norris Act met the same fate in 1928. 
Then in 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act, essentially the same as its predecessors, passed the Senate 75 to 
5 and the House 362 to 14, and was signed by Hoover.11 
The reason for this reversal was the changed economic climate. The depression heightened the 
potential for class conflict and forced the state to pay more attention to the demands of labor. Earl 
Michener, a conservative representative from Michigan who was a leading opponent of most reformist 
legislation, supported Norris-LaGuardia because the AFL had "done more than any other group or class 
of our people in maintaining peace and order during the depression"12 Other representatives joined in 
the support of the legislation because of the AFL’s non-militance and opposition to communism. 
Capital did not offer stiff opposition to Norris LaGuardia. One reason was that they hoped for 
relief from the courts. When President Hoover signed Norris-LaGuardia he released an opinion written 
by the Attorney General implying that it was unconstitutional. In fact, the act was not fully effective until 
the Supreme Court affirmed its constitutionality in 1938.13 A more important reason for capital’s 
apparent complacency was the availability of the same service from another source. Norris-LaGuardia 
restrictions affected only federal courts; state courts continued to issue injunctions and restraining 
orders against union activity. 
The National Industrial Recovery Act 
In the Spring of 1933 the economy was staggering. National income was less than half of its 
1929 level, unemployment was over twenty-five percent, thousands of banks had failed, farmers were 
going on "holidays" to protest falling food prices, and the unemployed were organizing and becoming 
more militant. In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "whether revolution was a real possibility or not, 
faith in a free system was plainly waning. Capitalism, it seemed to many, had spent its force...."14 
The New Deal is best seen as a necessary response to this crisis in capitalism. Roosevelt made no 
secret of the fact that the programs of his administration were designed to save the capitalist - system. 
The centerpiece of the N e w Deal was the National Industry Recovery Act, which provides direct state 
support to capital. The state would help capital form trade associations, which would fix prices and 
outputs so that profits could be maximized.15 
In the spring of 1933 William Green, president of AFL , threatened a general strike if legislation 
imposing a thirty hour work week were not enacted.16 Partly in response to such threats by labor, 
Roosevelt got the AFL involved in the drafting of the Recovery Act. The result was section 7a, which set 
minimum conditions of employment and affirmed the right of workers to organize. The labor provisions 
were included to buy union bureaucrats’ support for the N e w Deal, and their cooperation in the fight 
to save capitalism. 
The national Chamber of Commerce and the AFL made an agreement that the Chamber of 
Commerce would accept the labor sections of the Recovery Act and the AFL would support its pro-
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capital features.17 Capital was willing to make this deal because it was convinced that the act allowed 
the formation of company unions. 
Under the Recovery Act, trade union membership did increase, especially in mining and clothes 
manufacturing where vigorous organizing campaigns were conducted under the slogan "The President 
wants you to join a union"18 From 1933 to 1935 union membership increased by 900,000 to 3.6 million, 
although this was only 180,000 higher than the 1930 level and actually 500,000 less than 1929 
membership. Of the increase, four unions accounted for almost 700,000 - the United Mine Workers, the 
International Ladies Garment Workers, the United Textile Workers, and the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers.  
During the same period company unions sprang up everywhere as capital sought ways to avoid 
the labor provisions of the act. Company unions grew even faster than trade unions, with total 
membership reaching 2.5 million in 1935.19 
The National Labor Board (NLB), established to implement the labor provisions of the bill, had 
virtually no enforcement power and section 7a was widely evaded.20 Although capital was permitted to 
disobey the N L B at will, the states commitment to a pro-capital application of the Recovery Act was not 
completely exposed until the spring of 1934. A controversy in the automobile industry over the 
legitimacy of company unions settled on March 25, one day before a scheduled strike, when Roosevelt 
announced that he interpreted the Recovery Act to permit company unions. As observed by labor 
historian Irving Bernstein, "After March 25, 1934, determined unionists in the un-organized industries 
recognised that they would win bargaining rights not by invoking the law but by showing their own 
strength."21 
Later in the spring, with worker militance running high and a steel strike threatening, Roosevelt 
announced a plan to reorganize the National Labor Board to make it more effective. This move helped 
avert the steel strike, but the reorganization did little to benefit labor.22 
With labor’s faith in the Recovery Act undermined, workers began to rely more on their own 
collective strength. 1934 was the biggest strike year since the early 1920’s, with four strikes of special 
importance. A spring strike in Toledo against the Electric Auto-Lite Company was supported by massive 
demonstrations of the unemployed, several times erupted into violence, and very nearly evolved into a 
general strike. A truckers strike in Minneapolis lasted most of the summer, practically closed down the 
city, and at times verged on class warfare.† In San Francisco, a longshoring strike which started in May 
escalated into a general strike in July after a day long battle between police and strikers. In September a 
massive strike by 376,000 textile workers shut down that industry on the entire east coast, and ended 
only after the President intervened and the National Guard was called out in states from Rhode Island to 
Mississippi to break the strike.23 
The increasing militance and class consciousness of the rank and file was being forced on 
reluctant national union officers. The successful strikes Toledo and Minneapolis were led by Trotskyites, 
and in San Francisco by Stalinists.24 The state was backed into a corner as worker disaffection forced the 
N e w Dealers to come up with a labor policy that would protect capital by effectively limiting the 
radicalization of the working class. The response was the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.  
The National Labor Relations Act 
The NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, asserted the right of workers to form unions, and to 
protect this right it outlawed certain activities of capital. The forbidden acts, designated unfair labor 
practices, included the following:  
                                                          
†For example, in the "Battle of Deputies Run" on M ay 22 striking workers soundly defeated the police and the 
"Citizen’s Army," composed primarily of Minneapolis' social elite. Fifty were injured and two were killed, including 
a vice-president of American ball Company. Bernstein, Turbulent Years, p.238. 
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1. interference by capital with workers’ attempts to form a union, 
2. the establishment of company unions, 
3. discrimination against union members, 
4. refusal by capital to bargain about terms of employment with unions selected by a majority 
of the workers. 
To enforce the act the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created. The N L R B was to 
hear and decide cases involving unfair labor practices and was to conduct elections so that workers 
could determine whether or not a union would represent them.25 
The N L R B W3.S designed to sustain the "reasonable" collective bargaining approach to 
unionism practiced by the AFL, and was strongly supported by union bureaucrats. The former 
chairperson of the National Labor Board, Lloyd Garrison, favored the bill “as a safety measure, because I 
regard organized labor in this country as our chief bulwark against communism and other revolutionary 
movements."26 
The NLRA was designed to assure industrial peace, as pointed out by Roosevelt when he signed 
the bill: " By providing an orderly procedure for determining who is entitled to represent employees, it aims to 
remove one 01 the chief causes of wasteful economic strife.”27 
These statements by Garrison and Roosevelt capture the essence of the system-preserving nature of the 
NLRA. The NLRA was supportive of the AFL. It provided a legal sanction for unions, and established a peaceful 
method by which workers could choose democratically whether or not to have a union. 
With the NLRA there would be a peaceful alternative to organizing strikes.‡ In addition, workers would be 
likely to credit their success in part to government beneficence and the N e w Deal rather than learning to trust 
themselves. Because the NLRA encouraged the brand of business unionism practiced by the AFL, it relieved the 
threat of a labor movement opposed to capitalism. Without the NLRA, workers would have no recourse except to 
strike and force their employer to recognize their union. This type of action, if successful, would establish a militant 
tradition and help workers realize the potential of their collective strength. Once they recognized their collective 
potential, the formation of a radical working class movement would be possible. The left wing leadership of the 
major strikes of 1934 was a clear indication that workers were willing to become part of such a movement.  
The NLRA, then, was antiworking class in spite of the fact that it was pro-union. By supporting business 
unionism it helped undermine the radicalization of the working class. This system preserving action was taken by 
the state in spite of opposition from many capitalists, w h o would have preferred more direct repression of 
working class activity.  
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) opposed the NLRA because it outlawed company unions 
and because the other provisions went beyond the Recovery Act and would cause an annoyance for capital.§ Some 
capitalists agreed with Garrison and Roosevelt and supported the NLRA. Most supported the N A M position, but 
were not overly concerned when the NLRA passed because they confident that it would be declared 
unconstitutional by the courts. During the preceeding year twenty federal courts had ruled in Recovery Act cases 
that the federal government could not exercise control over local production. Based on these decisions 
capital deduced that the courts would not allow Congress to regulate the labor-management relations 
arising from production. The case for unconstitutionality was boosted when the Supreme Court struck 
down section I of the Recovery Act, including the labor provisions, while the NLRA was still being 
debated in Congress.28 Interestingly, the American Civil Liberties Union opposed the NLRA because of 
the conviction that the federal government would not treat unions fairly in its enforcement of the act, 
                                                          
‡ Organizing strikes attempt to force the employer to recognize a specific union as representative for his or her 
employees. 
§ The passage of the NLRA in the face of N A M opposition is not a deviation by the state from its procapital 
activities. Rather, it reflects a difference of opinion over how much attention should be paid to social harmony vis a 
vis profits. Frequently individual capitalists or groups of capitalists will support policies which are in their o w n self-
interest, rather than alternative courses of action (such as the NLRA) which better serve the needs of capitalism as 
a whole. 
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and because of the concern that labor would be "lulled into a sense of security" and lose sight of the fact 
that union militance was the only way to support the right to strike.29 
Experience under the NLRA 
A close look at the events of 1935 to 1947 reveals that the legal climate was not as favorable to 
labor as a cursory review of the NLRA might indicate. 
The enforcement of the NLRA was assigned to the National Labor Relations Board. However, 
most of the board’s time between 1935 and 1937 was devoted to defending the constitutionality of the 
NLRA. In the meantime most employers ignored the act. During the first two years capital abided by 
NLRA unfair labor practice decisions in only four cases. Furthermore, capital frequently secured federal 
court injunctions to prevent the N L R B from enforcing the act.30 
On April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA. However, 
challenges by capital continued until January 31, 1938, when a Supreme Court decision forbade federal 
courts from enjoining N L R B activities. After these rulings capital switched tactics. The N A M 
encouraged employers to evade the law with every means possible, suggesting ways to transfer 
company unions into "independent unions" as one course of action.31 The risk of evasion was low 
because the penalty for failure to comply with the NLRA was typically only an order to cease unlawful 
practices, or to rehire workers who had been fired illegally. 
In response to pressure from capital, Congress diverted the N L R B from its enforcement duties 
with three full scale investigations between 1937 and 1941. In addition, the state did not fund the N L R 
B adequately, assuring a long delay between the filing of a complaint and a decision. In 1937-38 the wait 
was slightly over a year, and by 1946-47 the delay was more than a year and a half.32 Following an N L R 
B decision, capital could further delay enforcement by appealing to the federal courts. 
After a detailed review of N L R B activities from 1935 to 1947, Millis (who chaired the N L R B 
from 1940 to 1945) and Brown concluded, "The most important deficiency was that the sound and 
democratic rights (of workers) under the Act were never fully protected The Board failed vigorously to 
push for enforcement and compliance with the act."33** 
Labor did not wait for the N L R B to enforce the NLRA. In the fall of 1935 a group of industrial 
unions from the AFL formed the Committee for Industrial Organization, later to break with the parent 
federation and change its name to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).34 Militant rank-and-file 
movements were already underway in the automobile, steel and rubber industries but the craft oriented 
AFL had done little to help the workers organize. The CIO immediately filled the void, and rode the wave 
of worker militance throughout the rest of the depression.  
The most effective tactic employed by CIO unions was the sit-down strike - an illegal takeover of 
property not protected under the NLRA.†† The biggest sit-down year was 1937 when almost 400,000 
workers were involved in approximately 500 sit-down strikes.35 
In the automobile industry sit-down strikes against General Motors (January-February, 1937) 
and Chrysler (March-April 1937) forced them to sign contracts with the United Automobile Workers, 
                                                          
**This demonstrates clearly the reformist nature of the NLRB and the variety of options open to the state to 
support capital. Many individual capitalists chose to ignore the law while waiting for a judicial reversal of the 
statute. W h e this failed to materialize, capital secured weak enforcement of the NLRA, and simultaneously laid 
the foundations for a future change in official policy. 
†† The willingness to disregard the law when tactically advantageous was forced on the CIO leadership by a militant 
rank-and-file. Though John L. Lewis. Philip Murray, and ocher CIO bureaucrats supported many spontaneous 
worker actions, they preferred the more legalistic alternative offered by the N L R B. The CIO clearly did a better 
job of taking advantage of worker discontent than the AFL , but was equally committed to the system politics CIO 
leaders were strong supporters of Roosevelt and heavily involved in the formation of N e w Deal policy. See Preis. 
Chapter 6 
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CIO. Hudson, Packard, and Studebaker saw the writing on the wall and quickly reached agreements with 
the Auto Workers, the latter two after N L R B elections. In the rubber industry workers began using sit-
down strikes in early 1936 to fight specific actions by capital, such as assembly line speed-ups or 
discrimination against union members. With unionism thus firmly entrenched, conventional strikes 
successfully forced recognition of the United Rubber Workers, CIO by Firestone in April 1937 and 
Goodrich in M a y 1937. In 1936 the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, CIO, organized the workers at 
United States Steel by infiltrating its company union (though declared illegal by the NLRA, company 
unions still dominated many industries). With its workers obviously organized, and with sit-down strikes 
sweeping the country, United States Steel chose the reasoned approach and recognized the CIO union 
without a strike in March 1937. Elsewhere in steel, workers at Jones and Laughlin refused a company 
offer of N L R B elections and successfully struck for union recognition in M a y 1937.36 
Unions grew rapidly in the later 1930’s because workers began to challenge capital directly and 
effectively. Sit-down strikes and a vigorous organizing drive by the CIO were responsible for much of the 
growth. Total union membership rose from 3.6 million in 1935 to 10.2 million by 1941.37 The experience 
of the period indicates that, with a few exceptions, capital obeyed the NLRA only when forced to by 
strong unions. 
Once militant union action won concessions and contracts from major employers, the N L R B 
election procedures provided to other employers in the industry or geographic area a peaceful arena in 
which to wage their struggle against unionization. This was often preferable to making a choice between 
conceding without a fight or suffering through a long battle. Even if the union won the election, at least 
the conflict would have been settled peacefully. With such a beginning the danger of having to face an 
angry union leadership would be lessened. 
This "legal organizing ; through elections conducted by the N L R B undoubtedly speeded the 
spread of unionism, but at the expense of establishing a militant tradition of economic gains won by 
direct worker action. As Cohen put it, "Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Wagner Act was the 
successful establishment of procedures to minimize the amount of industrial conflict associated with a 
massive drive for unionization."38 
Without the NLRA there undoubtedly would have been more militance in the 1930’s. The 
lengthy crisis was driving wages lower and lower, and working class dissatisfaction with the economic 
system was increasing. Workers had little respect for a private property oriented legal system designed 
to protect capitalism. In this atmosphere overt repression of unions by the state would only increase 
militance and heighten the potential that a radical working class movement would evolve. The NLRA 
protections, as weak as they were, gave workers some feeling that the state was responsive to their 
needs. And the NLRA provisions for union elections and the handling of unfair labor practice complaints 
provided a non-militant option for workers to register their discontent. 
Capital spent much of the period groping for a new strategy for its confrontations with labor. 
The increased militance of workers made the outright repression of earlier periods ineffective. A 
growing number of capitalists were beginning to see the advantages of collective bargaining. Leading 
capitalists expressing this view were Gerald Swope of General Electric and Cyrus Ching of United States 
Rubber.39 The formal bureaucratic procedures of the N L R B were slow, peaceful ways to settle labor 
disputes. The NLRA, though nominally pro-labor, was drawing unions away from militant tactics, both 
where capital chose to comply and where AFL or CIO bureaucrats met employer resistance with appeals 
to the N L R B rather than relying on worker militance. Examples of the former are General Electric and 
United States Rubber, where a receptive attitude resulted in union contracts without strikes and with 
virtually no turmoil in 1938. Examples of the latter are Little Steel and Ford, where unfair labor practice 
cases filed by CIO unions were tied up in the N L R B and the courts from 1937 to 1941 before resolution. 
After the C I O won the Little Steel court struggle, N L R B elections resulted in contracts with Bethlehem, 
Inland, Republic, and Youngstown without a strike. At Ford the workers were not as patient as the union 
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leadership and staged a spontaneous sit-down in August 1941, forcing the union to call a strike which 
broke Ford’s anti-unionism before an N L R B election could be conducted.40 
Capital eventually reached consensus, deciding that the NLRA should not be repealed but should 
be amended to better suit the needs of capital— union activity required more direction from the state. 
In 1939 both the N A M and the Chamber of Commerce adopted this line and began a careful and 
polished campaign to lay the foundation for a switch in state policy. Of particular importance was an 
anti-communist crusade, waged with newspaper advertisements and pamphlets and bolstered by 
hearings of the newly formed House Un- American Activities Committee; much of the propaganda was 
aimed at undermining the militant factions of the CIO.41 
The Labor Management Relations Act 
In 1940 the House responded to capital’s campaign with the Smith Act which included a number 
of restrictions on union activity. The reformist-oriented Senate however, was not yet convinced of the 
importance of altering labor policy and the final version of the bill included only minor modifications in 
N L R B procedures.42 The pressure for amendments to the N L R B subsided during World War II, as 
formal and informal controls such as the War Labor Board were employed to control labor militance. 
One pro-capital measure implemented during this period was the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 
which specifically limited the right to strike in war-related industry.43 
The wartime restrictions were not totally effective, in spite of no-strike pledges from most A FL 
and CIO leaders. Particularly important were a nation-wide coal miners’ strike in 1943 and a rash of 
wildcat strikes in the automobile industry throughout the war.44 
When the war ended strike controls were lifted and worker militance erupted in earnest. 1945, 
1946, 1947 were big strike years, with labor winning improved wages and working conditions in almost 
every major industry. There were more workers involved in strikes in 1945 and 1946 than at anytime 
during the depression.45 
The militance of workers was not well received by capital or the state. Even the reform-oriented 
members of Congress who had drafted the NLRA were disturbed by the disruptions of the economy, and 
began to discuss the need for "equalizing" legislation to control the "abuse of power" by big unions. The 
unlimited use of peaceful economic weapons by unions no longer served the needs of capital. As noted 
by Cox, "In 1947 there were many who saw the danger of nationwide stoppages threat to the social 
system."46 
In an attempt to get capital and labor to voluntarily work together for the good of the economic 
system, President Truman had convened a labor-management conference in the fall of 1945. The agents 
of capital and the union bureaucrats were able to agree on a few points (such as the benefits of peaceful 
collective bargaining and the need for a federal conciliation service) but not on others (such as 
management's right to manage). Disappointed at the failure of his attempt to secure voluntary 
cooperation between labor and capital and disturbed by the post-war strike wave, in January 1947 
Truman proposed several amendments to the NLRA, including limitations on jurisdictional strikes and 
secondary boycotts.47 
Throughout the spring of 1947 the agents of capital (N A M and Chamber of Commerce lawyers), 
working with House Republicans, drafted amendments to the NLRA. The resulting Hartley Act passed the 
House in April. A similar bill, the Taft Act, passed the Senate in May and the compromise Taft-Hartley Act (the 
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)) was accepted by both houses in June.48 The LMRA was not simply 
"equalizing" legislation. It placed restrictions on a wide variety of union activities, and demonstrated clearly the 
state’s role as protector of capital. 
The LMRA outlawed closed shops, required sixty days’ notice before a strike, required a non- Communist 
oath from all union officials, allowed states to outlaw union shops, and made collective bargaining contracts 
enforceable in the courts. The LMRA also added a list of unfair labor practices for labor unions, including: 
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 organizing strikes, 1.
 jurisdictional strikes, 2.
 secondary boycotts, 3.
 featherbedding, 4.
 refusal to bargain with management. 5.
Finally, the LMRA set up a complex procedure to deal with "national emergency" strikes; under 
this procedure, whenever the President decides that a strike endangers national health or safety, the 
strike can be enjoined by federal courts for 80 days.49 
As might be expected, organized labor fought hard against passage of the LMRA. After it was 
enacted, the AFL held a special conference to decide how to answer capital’s attack on labor. The 
conference passed the following resolution: 
 
"The repeal of this notorious legislation shall be our fixed objective. We shall never be 
reconciled to the acceptance of this legislation. We shall oppose it - fight it at every step and 
every opportunity - until we succeed in our efforts to bring about its repeal. Our action in this 
respect will be based upon the fact that we regard the Taft-Hartley Bill as a slave measure, un-
American, vicious and destructive of labor’s constitutional rights"50 
 
To achieve this objective AFL campaigned for Congressional candidates sympathetic to labor, 
and lobbied to bring about the repeal of the LMRA. But there has been no pressing need to pacify labor 
and the state has not shifted its policy. With the addition of a few more restrictions on union activity in 
1959, the LMRA is still the centerpiece of labor law today. 
The primary targets of the LMRA were worker militance and the spread of unionization. The 
LMRA sought to decrease worker militance by placing strict limits on picketing and striking activity and 
by outlawing secondary boycotts. It attempted to stop the spread of unionization by making organizing 
strikes illegal and by preventing established unions from exerting secondary pressures in support of 
organizing campaigns. The limitations on secondary pressures are probably the most important part of 
the LMRA because they limit the degree to which workers can support struggles in other industries and 
unions, thus hindering the development of a unified working class movement. 
The LMRA hit the targets at which it was aimed. Union membership, which grew from less than 
seven percent of the labor force in 1935 to about 24 percent in 1947, changed little over the next 
twenty five years, accounting for slightly less than 23 percent of the labor force in 1970. Strike activity 
also declined, with the downward trend continuing through the 1960’s.51 
The LMRA and the post World War II Red Scare, both emanating from the same source, 
combined to weaken the CIO, which conducted a purge against radicals, expelled militant unions, and 
eventually merged with the AFL in 1955.52 Established unions settled comfortably into the role of 
responsible business unionism. 
Legalistic control of labor would not be possible if there existed a class conscious union 
movement willing to disobey the law when such action would benefit workers. The rank and file 
acceptance of legalistic control can be traced in part to the Red Scare and the improved material 
conditions of workers in the 1950’s as compared to the 1930’s. Equally important is the suppression of 
militance by union bureaucrats. 
Leaders of most U.S. unions preach respect for the law because of their commitment to 
capitalism. In fact, union officials benefit directly from the increasing legalism in the collective bargaining 
area. The complexities of the collective bargaining contract are a convenient excuse for increased 
reliance on lawyers and other experts, and hence for bureaucratization of unions with the attendant 
centralization of control. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that union officials use the law and 
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experts to rationalize their o w n conservatism. Nor is it surprising that they concentrate their attention 
on wages, where they can deliver the goods without threatening capitalism.53 
Concluding Comments 
As the economic crisis of the 1930’s deepened, worker discontent grew. The militance of the 
working class throughout the period, especially from 1934 onward, required an effective response from 
the state. Rather than opting for outright suppression, which in all likelihood would have only fueled the 
flames of radicalism, N e w Dealers chose to make concessions to the working class. Most important, the 
official labor policy was supportive of union activity. 
Working class gains during the Great Depression cannot be credited to N e w Deal policies. 
Unions prospered to be sure. But, the NLRA and other labor laws were poorly enforced; capital obeyed 
them only when forced to by strong unions. The growth of union membership resulted from worker 
militance, not from protections offered by the state. 
New Deal labor policy was designed to buy worker acceptance of capitalism. If the state 
demonstrated sympathy, the working class would be less likely to challenge the existing order. 
Furthermore, the policies supported the continued development of the type of unionism practiced by 
the AFL. Both the AFL and the CIO preferred the legalistic approach to union organizing encouraged by 
the NLRA. The tendency was to eschew direct action and to opt instead for N L R B elections, or where 
capital was obstinate to file unfair labor practice complaints with the N L R B. As a result the working 
class was taught to rely on the protection of the law rather than on their own strength. Although the N e 
w Deal contributed only marginally to the unionization of the working class, it did help shape the 
movement which evolved. It furthered the expansion of unions which worked within the economic 
system, thus helping to avert the possibility that a new, more radical, movement would form which 
proposed an alternative to capitalism. Once the crisis was over the state adopted a more obviously pro-
capital approach, a clear indication that the N e w Deal labor policy offered short-term concessions only 
in the interest of the long-term health of capitalism. 
The information presented in the body of the paper lends support to the hypotheses that: (1) 
the role of labor law is to limit or direct union activity in ways consistent with the capitalist system; (2) 
the goal of the legislation is the containment of radical union activity; and (3) the direct involvement of 
the state in the ongoing struggle between labor and capital is necessary in order to protect the interests 
of capital. 
APPENDIX A 
A Brief Review of the Traditional Analysis 
Industrial relations specialists are remarkably consistent in their explanations of the evolution of 
labor law. The following summary makes no attempt to differentiate between the views of individual 
authors. It draws on the work of Archibald Cox, Sanford Cohen, and other established experts.54 
Prior to the 1930’s the federal government overtly aided management in its confrontations with 
labor. This due to the business community’s access to political power, the conservative property 
orientation of the federal courts (in particular the Supreme Court), and the prevailing attitude that what 
is good for business is good for the economy. 
During the 1930’s the official policy towards labor was dramatically altered. This resulted in part 
from a shift in ideology as the Great Depression reduced the public’s faith in business. The first 
indication of the changing atmosphere was Norris-LaGuardia, which reflected a Congressional desire to 
allow unions and management to solve their disagreements free from judicial interference. Norris-
LaGuardia, then, ushered in a brief period of federal government neutrality in labor-management 
relations.  
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With the election of Roosevelt and the advent of the N e w Deal, government involvement in the 
economy increased. As part of this growing presence provisions were included in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act to promote the spread of unionization and collective bargaining. The failure of many 
employers to comply with the act pointed out the need for a better enforcement mechanism. 
As the depression dragged on organized labor’s access to political power increased. In 1935, 
with the N e w Deal control of Congress at its peak, the NLRA was enacted. The NLRA was designed to 
encourage collective bargaining and therefore promote industrial peace. It was also expected that the 
bill would augment the bargaining strength of unions, which would result in higher wages and 
purchasing power and thus stimulate the economy. 
From 1935 to 1947 union membership grew dramatically, in great part because of the favorable 
legal climate. But the sitdown strikes of the late 1930’s, a few unpopular war-time strikes, and a great 
wave of strikes in 1946 caused a deepening public concern with the power of big unions. In the mid 
1940’s there was widespread support for government controls of union activity. Even Congressional 
friends of labor were in favor of equalizing legislation. The election of 1946 reestablished the political 
influence of business, and in 1947 the LMRA was passed. 
The LMRA introduced the current phase of labor relations law, with the government regulating 
the activities of both labor and management in an attempt to insure a smooth functioning economy 
uninterrupted by serious labor strife. The LMRA has not accomplished its objective of curbing the power 
of big unions, but has proved to be a burden for smaller and weaker unions.  
APPENDIX B 
Definitions 
⋅ Business unionism refers to the tendency of United States unions to concern themselves only 
with issues of wages and fringe benefits rather than becoming involved in radical demands 
or working class movements.  
⋅ A closed shop exists when a worker is required to be a union member as a condition of 
employment.  
⋅ Company unions are, employee organizations established and controlled by the employer, 
usually as a way to avoid recognizing a legitimate union.  
⋅ A Craft Union is composed of workers who share a specific skill, such as carpentry. 
⋅ "Featherbedding" is a term coined by management to refer to union demands for pay for 
work not performed. The concept is a tricky one however. For instance, if a union demands 
that four workers be assigned to a certain task instead of three (perhaps for safety reasons), 
the employer might claim that the fourth person is not needed and therefore is 
"featherbedding".  
⋅ An industrial union organizes and represents all of the workers in a specific industry 
regardless of skill. 
⋅ A jurisdictional strike is a strike by one union to protest an employer’s decision to sign a 
contract with another union, or to assign work to members of another union.  
⋅ Secondary boycotts involve a refusal of workers to use material produced by a firm (other 
than their own employer) involved in a dispute with its employees.  
⋅ A secondary strike is a strike by employees of one firm in support of a strike by employees of 
another firm.  
⋅ A union shop exists when a worker is required to join a union within a specified period 
(usually 90 days) after becoming employed.  
⋅ A wildcat strike is a walkout by workers which is unauthorized by the union and-or breaks a 
collective bargaining contract.  
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